Tight Bounds for Connectivity of Random K-out Graphs by Sood, Mansi & Yagan, Osman
Tight Bounds for the Probability of Connectivity
in Random K-out Graphs
Mansi Sood and Osman Yag˘an
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and CyLab,
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213 USA
msood@cmu.edu, oyagan@ece.cmu.edu
Abstract—Random K-out graphs are used in several applica-
tions including modeling by sensor networks secured by the ran-
dom pairwise key predistribution scheme, and payment channel
networks. The random K-out graph with n nodes is constructed
as follows. Each node draws an edge towards K distinct nodes
selected uniformly at random. The orientation of the edges
is then ignored, yielding an undirected graph. An interesting
property of random K-out graphs is that they are connected
almost surely in the limit of large n for any K ≥ 2. This means
that they attain the property of being connected very easily, i.e.,
with far fewer edges (O(n)) as compared to classical random
graph models including Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs (O(n logn)). This
work aims to reveal to what extent the asymptotic behavior of
random K-out graphs being connected easily extends to cases
where the number n of nodes is small. We establish upper
and lower bounds on the probability of connectivity when n is
finite. Our lower bounds improve significantly upon the existing
results, and indicate that random K-out graphs can attain a given
probability of connectivity at much smaller network sizes than
previously known. We also show that the established upper and
lower bounds match order-wise; i.e., further improvement on the
order of n in the lower bound is not possible. In particular, we
prove that the probability of connectivity is 1−Θ(1/nK2−1) for
all K ≥ 2. Through numerical simulations, we show that our
bounds closely mirror the empirically observed probability of
connectivity.
Index Terms—Random Graphs, Connectivity, Wireless Sensor
Networks, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Random graphs constitute an important framework for an-
alyzing the underlying structural characteristics of complex
real-world networks such as communication networks, social
networks and biological networks [1]–[3]. A class of random
graphs called the random K-out graphs is one of the earliest
known models of random graphs [4], [5]. The random K-out
graph comprising n nodes, denoted by H(n;K), is constructed
as follows. Each node draws K edges towards K distinct
nodes chosen uniformly at random from all other nodes. The
orientation of the edges is then ignored, yielding an undirected
graph. Due to their unique connectivity properties, random
K-out graphs have received renewed interest for analyzing
secure wireless sensor networks and routing in cryptocurrency
networks.
In the context of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), ran-
dom K-out graphs have been used extensively for evaluating
strategies for secure communication. The limited computation
and communication capabilities of WSNs precludes the use of
traditional key exchange protocols for establishing secure con-
nectivity [6]–[8]. Moreover, WSNs deployed for applications
such as battlefield surveillance and environmental monitoring
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and operational failures.
For facilitating secure connectivity in WSNs, Eschenauer and
Gligor [6] proposed the random predistribution of symmetric
cryptographic keys. Subsequently, several variants of random
key predistribution schemes have been studied; see [8], [9]
and the references therein. A widely adopted approach is the
random pairwise key predistribution introduced by Chan et
al. [10]. The random pairwise scheme is implemented in two
phases. In the first phase, each sensor node is paired offline
with K distinct nodes chosen uniformly at random among all
other sensor nodes. Next, a unique pairwise key is inserted in
the memory of each of the paired sensors. After deployment,
two sensor nodes can communicate securely only if they have
at least one key in common. ; see Figure 1. In Section II,
we provide more details about the implementation of this
scheme. The deployment of unique, pairwise keys brings
several advantages including resilience against node capture
and replication attacks, and quorum-based key revocation [10].
In the context of cryptocurrency networks, a growing body
of work is investigating the efficacy of routing protocols over
different network topologies [11]–[13]. A structure analo-
gous to random K-out graphs have been proposed to make
message propagation robust to de-anonymization attacks [14,
Algorithm 1]. In order to make cryptocurrency networks
more scalable, payment channel networks (PCNs) such as the
Lightning network have been introduced. A key challenge in
the design of PCNs is the trade-off between the number of
edges in the network (which is constrained since each edge
corresponds to funds escrowed in the PCN) and connectivity
(which is desirable to facilitate transactions between partic-
ipating nodes). Given their ability to get connected with a
relatively smaller number of edges, random K-out graphs offer
a promising potential for informing the topological properties
of such networks.
In several networked applications, connectivity is a funda-
mental determinant of the system performance. For instance,
connectivity enables any pair of nodes to exchange mes-
sages in a communication network, or exchange funds in a
cryptocurrency network. However, establishing links can be
costly and often the goal is to obtain a connected network
as efficiently as possible, i.e., by using the least amount of
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Fig. 1: A WSN with 6 nodes secured by the random pairwise key
predistribution scheme with scheme parameter K = 2. Each node
randomly selects K = 2 nodes and unique pairwise cryptographic
keys are given to node pairs per selection. Two nodes can communicate
securely if they have at least one key in common. This induces a graph
with edges corresponding to node pairs that share a key.
resources (links). The connectivity of random K-out graphs
and their heterogeneous variants have been extensively studied
[4], [15]–[17]. It is known [4], [15] that random K-out graphs
are connected with probability tending to one (as n→∞) if
and only if K ≥ 2. In particular, the following zero-one law
holds:
lim
n→∞P [H(n;K) is connected] =
{
1 if K ≥ 2,
0 if K = 1.
(1)
A key advantage of H(n;K) is its ability to get connected
very easily. With K = 2, H(n;K) contains at most 2n edges
meaning that on average, each node has a degree of less than
4. On the other hand, the classical Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random
graph [18] requires an average degree of the order of log n for
connectivity; other models with similar connectivity behavior
to ER graphs include random key graphs [19] and random
geometric graphs [20]. Most existing results for random K-out
graphs describe the behavior of the network when the number
of nodes n approaches ∞ in the form of asymptotic zero-one
laws. However, in practical scenarios, the number of nodes in
the network are often constrained to be finite. This raises the
need to go beyond the asymptotic results (valid for n → ∞)
and obtain as tight bounds as possible for the case when n is
small.
Let P (n;K) denote the probability of connectivity of
H(n;K) as a function of the number of nodes (n) and
the number of selections (K) per node. Connectivity is a
monotonic increasing property in the number of edges and
as a consequence P (n;K) increases as K increases. The case
where K = 2 corresponds to the critical threshold (1) for
connectivity. Therefore, we first focus on deriving bounds on
P (n;K) for the case K = 2, and then generalize them to
all K ≥ 2. First, we derive the best known lower bound for
P (n; 2), i.e., the probability of connectivity for K = 2. Next,
by deriving an upper bound on P (n; 2), we show that the
lower bound matches the upper bound order-wise, implying
that further improvement on the order of n is not possible.
While our key focus is on the K = 2 threshold, we also
derive the lower and upper bounds for all K ≥ 2, with our
lower bound beating the existing bounds for all K ≥ 2; see
Section III for a detailed comparison of the bounds and the
empirical probability of connectivity. Moreover, to the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to derive an upper
bound on P (n;K), which shows that the lower bound is
order-wise optimal. The matching upper and lower bounds for
the general case K = 2 derived in this paper establish that
the probability of connectivity is 1 − Θ(1/nK2−1), i.e, the
probability of not being connected decays as Θ(1/nK
2−1).
Our results significantly improve the probabilistic guarantees
for network designs that induce random K-out graphs. For
example, we show that n = 30 (resp. n = 60) is sufficient to
have a probability of connectivity of 1−10−4 (resp. 1−10−5),
while the best known previous result would indicate that
n ≥ 72 (resp. n ≥ 150) is necessary.
Organization: In Section II we describe the random pair-
wise scheme and the resulting random K-out graphs. In
Section III we present our bounds for connectivity in random
K-out graphs and compare them with existing results. We
present the proofs of the lower and upper bounds, respectively
in Sections IV and V, and conclude in Section VI.
Notation: All limits are understood with the number of
nodes n going to infinity. While comparing asymptotic be-
havior of a pair of sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn),
an = ω(bn), an = O(bn), an = Θ(bn), and an = Ω(bn)
with their meaning in the standard Landau notation. All
random variables are defined on the same probability triple
(Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements are made with respect to
this probability measure P, and we denote the corresponding
expectation operator by E. The cardinality of a discrete set A
is denoted by |A| and the set of all positive integers by N0.
II. MODEL: RANDOM K-OUT GRAPHS
The random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan
et al. is parametrized by two positive integers n and K
such that K < n. This scheme is implemented as follows.
Consider a network comprising of n nodes indexed by labels
i = 1, 2, . . . n with unique IDs: Id1, . . . , Idn. Each of the
n nodes draws K edges towards K distinct nodes chosen
uniformly at random from among all other nodes. Nodes
vi and vj are deemed to be paired if at least one of them
selected the other; i.e., either vi selects vj , or vj selects
vi, or both. Once the offline pairing process is complete,
the set of keys to be inserted to nodes are determined as
follows. For any vi, vj that are paired with each other as
described above, a unique pairwise key ωij is generated and
inserted in the memory modules of both nodes vi and vj along
with the corresponding node IDs. It is important to note that
ωij is assigned exclusively to nodes vi and vj to be used
solely in securing the communication between them. In the
post-deployment key-setup phase, nodes first broadcast their
IDs to their neighbors following which each node searches
for the corresponding IDs in their key rings. Finally, nodes
that have been paired verify each others’ identities through a
cryptographic handshake [10].
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of node labels. For
each i ∈ N , let Γn,i ⊆ N−i denote the labels selected by
node vi (uniformly at random from N−i). Specifically, for
any subset A ⊆ N−i, we have
P[Γn,i = A] =
{ (
n−1
K
)−1
if |A| = K
0 otherwise.
(2)
Thus, the selection of Γn,i is done uniformly amongst all
subsets of N−i which are of size exactly K. Under the full-
visibility assumption, i.e., when one-hop secure communica-
tion between a pair of sensors hinges solely on them having
a common key, a WSN comprising of n sensors secured by
the pairwise key predistribution scheme can be modeled by
a random K-out graph defined as follows. With n = 2, 3, . . .
and positive integer K < n, we say that two distinct nodes vi
and vj are adjacent, denoted by vi ∼ vj if they have at least
one common key in their respective key rings. More formally,
vi ∼ vj if j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn,j . (3)
Let H(n;K) denote the undirected random graph on the vertex
set {v1, . . . , vn} induced by the adjacency notion (3). In the
literature on random graphs, H(n;K) is often referred to as
a random K-out graph and have been widely studied [4], [5],
[15], [21]–[23].
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present our main results, upper and lower
bounds for the probability of connectivity of H(n;K), and
compare them with existing results. Throughout, we write
P (n;K) := P[ H(n;K) is connected ].
A. Main results
We provide our first technical result– an upper bound for
the probability of connectivity P (n;K).
Theorem 3.1 (Upper Bound): For any fixed positive integer
K ≥ 2, we have
P (n;K) ≤ 1− (K!)
Ke−K(K+1)
K + 1
· 1
nK2−1
(1 + o(1)) (4)
We present the asymptotic version of the upper bound in
Theorem 3.1 to make it easier to interpret; see Appendix for
the more detailed bound with an explicit expression replacing
the (1+o(1)) term in (4). The dependence of the upper bound
on the scheme parameter K can be succinctly captured as
follows.
Remark 3.2: For a fixed positive integer K ≥ 2,
P (n;K) = 1− Ω
(
1
nK2−1
)
. (5)
Given a fixed value of the parameter K (K ≥ 2), we derive the
upper bound on the probability of connectivity by computing
the likelihood of existence of isolated components comprising
K + 1 nodes. Due to space constraints, we outline the proof
for the case of K = 2 in Section IV and present the full
proof (K ≥ 2) in the Appendix. In our second main result,
we derive an order-wise matching lower bound and show that
the probability of connectivity is also 1−O
(
1
nK2−1
)
.
Theorem 3.3 (Lower Bound): For any fixed positive integer
K ≥ 2, for all n ≥ 4(K + 2), we have
P (n;K) ≥ 1− c(n;K)Q(n;K) (6)
where,
c(n;K) =
e−(K
2−1)(1−K+1n )√
2pi(K + 1)
√
n
(n−K − 1) , (7)
Q(n;K) =
(
K + 1
n
)K2−1
+
n
2
(
K + 2
n
)(K+2)(K−1)
(8)
Remark 3.4: For any fixed positive integer K ≥ 2 we have
P (n;K) = 1−O
(
1
nK2−1
)
. (9)
This shows that our lower bound (6) for connectivity matches
our upper bound (4), and is therefore order-wise optimal.
Combining (5) and (9), we obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.5: For any positive integer K ≥ 2, for all n ≥
4(K + 2), we have
P (n;K) = 1−Θ
(
1
nK2−1
)
(10)
The above equation indicates how rapidly P (n;K) converges
to one as n grows large.
B. Previous results in [4], [15]
We present a summary of the related lower bounds [4],
[15] on the probability of connectivity. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first to compute an upper bound
on the probability of connectivity for random K-out graphs.
1) Earlier results by Yag˘an and Makowski [15]: It was
established [15, Theorem 1] that for K ≥ 2,
P (n;K) ≥ 1− a(K)Q(n;K) (11)
holds for all n ≥ n(K) with n(K) = 4(K + 2), where
a(K) = e−
1
2 (K+1)(K−2). (12)
2) Earlier results by Fenner and Frieze [4]: A lower bound
for probability of connectivity can be inferred from the proof
of [4, Theorem 2.1, p. 348]. Upon inspecting Eqn. 2.2 in [4,
p. 349] with p = 0; it can be inferred that
P (n;K) ≥ 1− b(n;K)Q(n;K) (13)
holds for all n and K such that K < n, where
b(n;K) =
12n
12n− 1
√
1
2pi(K + 1)
√
n
n−K − 1 . (14)
Observe from (6), (11) and (13), that the smaller the values
of c(n;K), a(K) and b(n;K), the better is the corresponding
lower bound. As discussed in [15], the bound (13) by Fenner
and Frieze is tighter than (11) when K = 2, while (11) is
tighter than (13) for all K ≥ 3. Upon examining (7), (12)
and (14), we can see that our bound given in Theorem 3.1 is
tighter than both (11) and (13) for all K ≥ 2. We illustrate the
performance of these bounds in the succeeding discussion.
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Fig. 2: A zoomed in view of our results and empirical probability of
connectivity (computed by averaging 106 independent experiments for
each data point) for K = 2 as a function of n for n ≥ 16. The lower
bound corresponds to Theorem 3.3 and the upper bound corresponds
to Theorem 3.1.
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Fig. 3: Lower bounds and empirical probability of connectivity (com-
puted by averaging 106 independent experiments for each data point)
for K = 2 as a function of n for n ≥ 16. Our lower bound given
in Theorem 3.3 significantly improves the existing lower bounds by
Yag˘an and Makowski [15], and Fenner and Frieze [4].
C. Discussion
Through simulations, we study how our upper and lower
bounds compare with the empirically observed probability of
connectivity. We consider a network secured by the pairwise
scheme with parameter K = 2 and compute the empirical
probability of connectivity as we vary the number of nodes n.
For each parameter pair (n,K), we generate 106 independent
realizations of H(n;K). To obtain the empirical probability
of connectivity, we divide the number of instances for which
the generated graph is connected by the total number (106)
of instances generated; see Figure 2. Next, we compare the
lower bound for P (n;K) presented in Theorem 3.3 with the
corresponding bounds in [4], [15]. Recall from (1) that K = 2
is the critical threshold for connectivity of H(n;K) in the
limit of large network size; thus, we focus on the case K = 2
throughout the simulations. Substituting K = 2 in (8), (7), (12)
and (14), we obtain the following lower bounds on P (n; 2),
YM [15] : P (n; 2) ≥ 1− 155
n3
(15)
FF [4] : P (n; 2) ≥ 1− 155
n3
· 12n/(12n− 1)√
6pi
√
n
n− 3 (16)
This work : P (n; 2) ≥ 1− 155
n3
· e
−(3− 9n )√
6pi
√
n
n− 3 (17)
With K = 2, we plot the lower bounds (6), (11) and
(13) for comparison in Figure 3. In Table I, we compare
the mean number of realizations of H(n;K) generated until
one disconnected realization is observed corresponding to the
lower bounds (15), (16) and (17) for K = 2.
Our results show that H(n;K) gets connected with prob-
abilistic guarantees as high as 99.92% even when K = 2
and network consisting of as few as 16 nodes. These results
complete and complement the existing asymptotic zero-one
laws for random K-out graphs.
Mean number of disconnected realizations
n Theorem 3.3 YM [15] FF [4]
16 1 in 1183 1 in 26 1 in 102
20 1 in 2645 1 in 51 1 in 205
25 1 in 5753 1 in 100 1 in 409
35 1 in 17834 1 in 276 1 in 1145
TABLE I: Comparison of the lower bound (6) with existing lower
bounds (11) and (13) from [15] and [4], respectively for K = 2. The
entries in the table corresponds to the mean number of realizations of
H(n;K) generated until one disconnected realization is observed.
IV. UPPER BOUND ON PROBABILITY OF CONNECTIVITY
For easier exposition, we give a proof of Theorem 3.1 here
for K = 2. Due to space constraints, the general version of
our proof for K ≥ 2 is given in the Appendix. For K = 2,
each node selects at least two other nodes and there can be
no isolated nodes or node pairs in H(n;K). Thus, for K = 2,
the smallest possible isolated component is a triangle, i.e., a
complete sub-networks over three nodes such that each node
selects the other two nodes. To derive the upper bound on
connectivity, we first derive a lower bound on the probability
of existence of isolated triangles in H(n;K). In the proof
for the general case (K ≥ 2) presented in the Appendix, we
investigate the existence of isolated components of size K+1.
Let ∆ijk denote the event that nodes vi, vj and vk form an
isolated triangle in H(n;K). The number of isolated triangles
in H(n;K), denoted by Zn is given by
Zn =
∑
1≤i<j<k≤n
1{∆ijk} (18)
Note that the existence of one or more isolated triangles (Zn ≥
1), implies that H(n;K) is not connected. Thus, we can upper
bound the probability of connectivity of H(n;K) as
P[ H(n;K) is connected ]
= 1− P[ H(n;K) is not connected ]
= 1− P[ ∃ at least one isolated sub-network in H(n;K) ]
≤ 1− P[ ∃ at least one isolated triangle in H(n;K) ]
= 1− P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]. (19)
where,
[Zn ≥ 1] = ∪1≤i<j<k≤n1{∆ijk}. (20)
In the succeeding discussion, we assume K = 2 and use
the Bonferroni inequality [24] to lower bound the union of the
events 1{∆ijk}, where 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n.
P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]
≥
∑
i<j<k
P[ ∆ijk ]−
∑
i<j<k
∑
x<y<z
P[ ∆ijk ∩∆xyz ] (21)
For all 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n and 1 ≤ x < y < z ≤ n, we have
P[ ∆ijk ] =
(
1(
n−1
2
))3((n−42 )(
n−1
2
))n−3 (22)
Moreover, note that if the sets {i, j, k} and {x, y, z} have one
or more nodes in common, then these sets cannot simultane-
ously constitute isolated triangles; i.e., the events ∆ijk, ∆xyz
are mutually exclusive if {i, j, k} ∩ {x, y, z} 6= ∅. Thus,
P[ ∆ijk ∩∆xyz ] =

0 if {i, j, k} ∩ {x, y, z} 6= φ,(
1
(n−12 )
)6(
(n−72 )
(n−12 )
)n−6
otherwise.
(23)
We now calculate the term appearing in (21) in turn. We have∑
i<j<k
P[ ∆ijk ] =
(
n
3
)
P[ ∆ijk ]
=
(
n
3
)(
1(
n−1
2
))3((n−42 )(
n−1
2
))n−3
=
4n
3(n− 1)2(n− 2)2
2∏
`=1
(
1− 3
n− `
)n−3
≥ 4
3n3
(
1− 3
n− 2
)2n−6
, (24)
and ∑
i<j<k
∑
x<y<z
P[ ∆ijk ∩∆xyz ]
=
(
n
3
)(
n− 3
3
)(
1(
n−1
2
))6((n−72 )(
n−1
2
))n−6
=
16n(n− 3)(n− 4)(n− 5)
9(n− 1)5(n− 2)5
2∏
`=1
(
1− 6
n− `
)n−6
≤ 16n
4
9(n− 2)10
(
1− 6
n− 1
)2n−12
. (25)
Substituting (24) and (25) in (21), we obtain
P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]
≥
∑
i<j<k
P[ ∆ijk ]−
∑
i<j<k
∑
x<y<z
P[ ∆ijk ∩∆xyz ]
≥ 4
3n3
(
1− 3
n− 2
)2n−6
− 16n
4
9(n− 2)10
(
1− 6
n− 1
)2n−12
=
4e−6
3n3
(1 + o(1)) (26)
Reporting this into (19) leads to establishing Theorem 3.1 for
K = 2. More compactly, this result can be stated as P (n; 2) =
1−Ω ( 1n3 ). We prove the more general result for K ≥ 2 in the
Appendix. The next Section is devoted establishing a matching
lower bound on the probability of connectivity.
V. LOWER BOUND ON PROBABILITY OF CONNECTIVITY
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider a fixed positive integer K.
The conditions
2 ≤ K and e(K + 2) < n (27)
are enforced throughout. Note that the condition e(K+2) < n
automatically implies K < n.
A. Preliminaries
Before proceeding with the proof, we discuss one of the
key steps which distinguishes our proof and improves upon
existing [4], [15] bounds. In contrast to the standard bound(
n
r
) ≤ (ner )r used in [15], we upper bound (nr) using a variant
[25] of Stirling formula. For all x = 1, 2, . . . , we have
√
2pixx+0.5e−xe
1
12x+1 < x! <
√
2pixx+0.5e−xe
1
12x , (28)
which gives(
n
r
)
≤ 1√
2pi
(
n
n− r
)n−r (n
r
)r √n√
n− r√r
· exp
{
1
12n
− 1
12(n− r) + 1 −
1
12r + 1
}
≤ 1√
2pi
(
n
n− r
)n−r (n
r
)r √n√
n− r√r , (29)
since
1
12n
− 1
12(n− r) + 1 −
1
12r + 1
< 0
Using the upper bound for
(
n
r
)
as presented in (29) eventually
leads to the factor e−(K
2−1)(1−K+1n ) improvement in the lower
bound on probability of connectivity in Theorem 3.3. Next, we
note that for 0 ≤ K ≤ x ≤ y,(
x
K
)(
y
K
) = K−1∏
`=0
(
x− `
y − `
)
≤
(
x
y
)K
(30)
since x−`y−` decreases as ` increases from ` = 0 to ` = K − 1.
Lastly, for all x ∈ R, we have
1± x ≤ e±x. (31)
B. Proof of Theorem 3.3
If H(n;K) is not connected, then there exists a non-empty
subset S of nodes that is isolated. Further, since each node is
paired with at least K neighbors, |S| ≥ K + 1. Let Cn(K)
denote the event that H(n;K) is connected. We have
Cn(K)
c ⊆
⋃
S∈Pn: |S|≥K+1
Bn(K;S) (32)
where Pn stands for the collection of all non-empty subsets
of N . Let Pn,r denotes the collection of all subsets of N with
exactly r elements. A standard union bound argument yields
P [Cn(K)c] ≤
∑
S∈Pn:K+1≤|S|≤bn2 c
P [Bn(K;S)]
=bn2 c∑
r=K+1
 ∑
S∈Pn,r
P [Bn(K;S)]
 . (33)
For each r = 1, . . . , n, let Bn,r(K) = Bn(K; {1, . . . , r}).
Under the enforced assumptions, exchangeability implies
P [Bn(K;S)] = P [Bn,r(K)] , S ∈ Pn,r
and since |Pn,r| =
(
n
r
)
, we have∑
S∈Pn,r
P [Bn(K;S)] =
(
n
r
)
P [Bn,r(K)] (34)
Substituting (34) into (33) we obtain
P [Cn(K)c] ≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
(
n
r
)
P [Bn,r(K)] .
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
(
n
r
)((r−1
K
)(
n−1
K
))r((n−r−1K )(
n−1
K
) )n−r . (35)
Using (30) in (35) together with (29), we conclude that
P [Cn(K)c]
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
(
n
r
)(
r − 1
n− 1
)rK (
1− r
n− 1
)(n−r)K
(36)
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
(
n
r
)( r
n
)rK (
1− r
n
)(n−r)K
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
1√
2pi
(
n
n− r
)n−r (n
r
)r √n√
n− r√r
·
(
r − 1
n− 1
)rK (
1− r
n− 1
)(n−r)K
=
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
√
n√
2pi
√
n− r√r
( r
n
)r(K−1) (
1− r
n
)(n−r)(K−1)
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
√
n√
2pi
√
n− r√r
(r
n
)r(K−1)
e−(
r
n )(n−r)(K−1), (37)
where (37) follows from (31). For K+1 ≤ r ≤ bn2 c, we have
r(n− r) ≥ (K + 1)(n−K − 1) (38)
Substituting in (37),
P [Cn(K)c]
≤
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
√
n√
2pi
√
n−K − 1√K + 1
( r
n
)r(K−1)
· e−(K+1n )(n−K−1)(K−1)
=
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
( r
n
)r(K−1) e−(K2−1)(1−K+1n )√
2pi(K + 1)
√
n
(n−K − 1) .
= c(n;K)
bn2 c∑
r=K+1
( r
n
)r(K−1)
= c(n;K)
(
K + 1
n
)K2−1
+ c(n;K)
bn2 c∑
r=K+2
( r
n
)r(K−1)
(39)
with c(n;K) given by (7). Due to space constraints we in
present the sequence of steps leading to the final bound in
Theorem 3.3 in the Appendix.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we derive upper and lower bounds for con-
nectivity for random K-out graphs when the number of nodes
is finite. Our matching upper and lower bounds prove that
the probability of connectivity is 1 − Θ(1/nK2−1) for all
K ≥ 2. Our lower bound is shown to significantly improve
the existing ones. In particular, our results further strengthen
the applicability of random K-out graphs as an efficient way to
construct a connected network topology even when the number
of nodes is small. It would be interesting to pursue further
applications of K-out graphs in the context of cryptographic
payment channel networks.
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APPENDIX
A. Upper bound on probability of connectivity for K ≥ 2
In Section IV we proved Theorem 3.1 for the case K = 2.
In this section, we prove the upperbound for the general case
K ≥ 2. Let K be a fixed positive integer such that K ≥ 2.
Let ∆i1...iK+1 denote the event that nodes vi, vj , . . . , vK+1
form an isolated component in H(n;K). The number of such
isolated components of size K + 1 in H(n;K), denoted by
Zn is given by
Zn =
∑
1≤i1<i2···<iK+1≤n
1{∆i1...iK+1} (40)
Note that the existence of one or more isolated components
of size K + 1 (Zn ≥ 1), implies that H(n;K) is not
connected. We can upper bound the probability of connectivity
of H(n;K) as
P[ H(n;K) is connected ]
= 1− P[ H(n;K) is not connected ]
= 1− P[ ∃ at least one isolated sub-network ]
≤ 1− P[ ∃ at least one isolated component of size K + 1 ]
= 1− P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]. (41)
where,
{Zn ≥ 1} =
⋃
1≤i1<i2···<iK+1≤n
1{∆i1...iK+1}. (42)
In the succeeding discussion, we use the Bonferroni inequal-
ity [24] to lower bound the union of the events given in (41).
P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]
≥
∑
i1<i2···<iK+1
P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ] (43)
−
∑
i1<i2···<iK+1
∑
j1<j2···<jK+1
P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ∩∆j1...jK+1 ]
(44)
For all 1 ≤ i1 < i2 · · · < iK+1 ≤ n and 1 ≤ j1 < j2 · · · <
jK+1 ≤ n, we have
P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ] =
(
1(
n−1
K
))K+1((n−K−2K )(
n−1
K
) )n−K−1 (45)
Moreover, note that if the sets {i1, . . . , iK+1} and
{j1, . . . , jK+1} have one or more nodes in common, then these
sets cannot simultaneously constitute isolated components.
Thus, P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ∩∆j1...jK+1 ] =
0 if {i1, . . . , iK+1} ∩ {j1, . . . , jK+1} 6= φ,(
1
(n−1K )
)2(K+1)(
(n−2K−3K )
(n−1K )
)n−2(K+1)
otherwise.
(46)
We now calculate the term appearing in (44) in turn. We have∑
i1<i2···<iK+1
P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ]
=(
n
K + 1
)
P[ ∆i1...iK+1 ]
=
(
n
K + 1
)(
1(
n−1
K
))K+1((n−K−2K )(
n−1
K
) )n−K−1
=
(K!)Kn
K + 1
·
(
(n−K − 1)!
(n− 1)!
)K K∏
`=1
·
(
1− K + 1
n− `
)n−K−1
≥ (K!)
K
K + 1
· 1
n(K2−1)
K∏
`=1
·
(
1− K + 1
n− `
)n−K−1
≥ (K!)
K
K + 1
· 1
n(K2−1)
·
(
1− K + 1
n−K
)K(n−K−1)
(47)
=
(K!)Ke−K(K+1)
K + 1
· 1
n(K2−1)
(1 + o(1))
where (47) is plain from the observation that for all ` in
1, . . . ,K,
1− K + 1
n− ` ≥ 1−
K + 1
n−K .
Next, ∑
i1<···<iK+1
∑
j1<···<jK+1
P[ ∆i1,...,iK+1 ∩∆j1,...,jK+1 ]
=
(
n
K + 1
)(
n−K − 1
K + 1
)(
1(
n−1
K
))2(K+1)
·
((
n−2K−3
K
)(
n−1
K
) )n−2(K+1)
≤
(
n
K + 1
)(
n−K − 1
K + 1
)(
1(
n−1
K
))2(K+1)
·
(
n− 2K − 3
n− 1
)K(n−2(K+1))
(48)
=
n!
(n− 2(k + 1))!((K + 1)!)2
(
K!(
n−1
K
))2(K+1)
·
(
n− 2K − 3
n− 1
)K(n−2(K+1))
=
(K!)2(K+1)
((K + 1)!)2
n(n− 1) . . . (n− 2K − 3)
(n(n− 1) . . . (n−K))2(K+1)
·
(
n− 2K − 3
n− 1
)K(n−2(K+1))
≤ (K!)
2(K+1)
((K + 1)!)2
· n
2(K+1)
(n−K)2K(K+1)
·
(
1− 2(K + 1)
n− 1
)K(n−2(K+1))
, (49)
where (48) follows from (30).Substituting (47) and (49) in
(44), we obtain
P[ Zn ≥ 1 ]
≥
∑
i1<i2···<iK+1
P[ ∆i1···K+1 ]
−
∑
i1<i2···<iK+1
∑
j1<j2···<jK+1
P[ ∆i1···K+1 ∩∆j1,...,jK+1 ]
≥ (K!)
K
K + 1
· 1
n(K2−1)
(
1− K + 1
n−K
)K(n−K−1)
− (K!)
2(K+1)
((K + 1)!)2
· n
2(K+1)
(n−K)2K(K+1)
·
(
1− 2(K + 1)
n− 1
)K(n−2(K+1))
=
(K!)Ke−K(K+1)
K + 1
· 1
n(K2−1)
(1 + o(1)) (50)
= Ω
(
1
nK2−1
)
.
In view of (41), we then obtain for K ≥ 2 that
P[ H(n;K) is connected ] = 1− Ω
(
1
nK2−1
)
.
B. Bounding the sum in (39)
Recall that K is a fixed positive integer ≥ 2 and under the
constraint (27) we have K + 2 ≤ bn2 c, and therefore the sum
in (39) is not empty. Let(x
n
)x(K−1)
= e(K−1)fn(x), x ≥ 1 (51)
with
fn(x) = x log
(x
n
)
= x (log x− log n) .
Observe that r → fn(r) decreases monotonically on the
interval r = 1, . . . , bne c and increases monotonically thereafter
on the interval r = bne c+ 1, . . . , bn2 c. Therefore,
max
(
fn(r), r = K + 2, . . . ,
⌊n
2
⌋)
= max
(
fn(K + 2), fn
(⌊n
2
⌋))
. (52)
From (27), we have K + 2 ≤ bne c. Next, we show that
fn
(⌊n
2
⌋)
≤ fn(K + 2) (53)
for all n large enough, say n ≥ n(K) for some finite integer
n(K) which depends on K. (53) is equivalent to⌊n
2
⌋
log
(⌊
n
2
⌋
n
)
≤ (K + 2) (log(K + 2)− log n) ,
a condition can be expressed as
n
(⌊
n
2
⌋
n
)
log
(⌊
n
2
⌋
n
)
≤ (K + 2) (log(K + 2)− log n) .
The mapping t→ t log t is monotone increasing on the interval
(e−1,∞). Since ⌊n2 ⌋ ≤ n2 , for the inequality (53) to hold, if
suffices to show
−
(n
2
)
log 2 ≤ (K + 2) (log(K + 2)− log n) (54)
for all n satisfying the constraint
1
e
<
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋
.
It is easy to see that this occurs for all n > 4, which is in
fact automatically guaranteed under (27). Condition (54) can
be simplified to yield
log n ≤
(
log 2
2(K + 2)
)
· n+ log(K + 2). (55)
It can be verified that (55) holds as an equality for n = 4(K+
2) and a strict inequality for all n > 4(K+2). Setting n(K) =
4(K + 2) is therefore sufficient for (54) (hence (53)) to hold.
Using (51), (52) and (53) we get
max
(( r
n
)r(K−1)
: r = K + 2, . . . ,
⌊n
2
⌋)
=
(
K + 2
n
)(K+2)(K−1)
for all n ≥ n(K) yielding
bn2 c∑
r=K+2
( r
n
)r(K−1)
≤
⌊n
2
⌋
·
(
K + 2
n
)(K+2)(K−1)
.
Substituting in (39) and noting that P (n;K) =
1− P [Cn(K)c], we obtain (6.
